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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW: ASPORTATION AS ELEMENT OF
LARCENY OF ANIMALS
Neither the judicial decisions nor the statutes of England and the
United States provide a well-defined concept of asportation in larceny
as applied to the killing of animals. The requirement of the element
of asportation often renders difficult any ascertainment of larceny. A
review of the historical development of this concept and its application to specific factual situations may serve to clarify its currently
vague and rudimentary definition.
LACENy Am

ASPORTA-noN Dx'nqm

the
Larceny at common law has been defined generally as ...
wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person of
the mere personal goods of another, from any place, with a felonious
intent to convert them to his (the taker's) own use, and make them
his own property, without the consent of the owner."' In line with
this definition, common law larceny requires a carrying away2 or
asportation, which has been defined as follows: 3
'To constitute asportation, the thief must obtain complete control, and must make such a removal that every part of the physical
substance will have changed its place, but it is immaterial how
slightly, or whether or not it is taken away frbm the owner's
premises, or for how brief a time the control continues, -the
property during such time not remaining attached either to the
soil or to any other thing not removed. Nothing short of this will
m
suffice.
"
The Florida Court follows this exposition, and has stated that the
slightest removal of property from its location is sufficient. 4 Therefore, any change of location that transfers dominion of the property
'Regina v. Holloway, 2 Car. & K. 942, 946, 175 Eng. Rep. 395, 397 (N.P.
1848); cf. Rex v. Simmons, Kel. J. 31, 84 Eng. Rep. 1068 (K.B. 1664); Muaxn,
CmumAL LAw §109 (1934).
24 BL. CoML 229; see 2 BISHOP, CsmmAL LAW §758 (9th ed. 1923).
32 BiSHOP, CXIMINAL LAw §794 (9th ed. 1923); see Mnmm,CmaMnLx LAw

§113 (1934).
.Fitch v. State, 135 Fla. 361, 185 So. 435 (1938); Driggers v. State, 96 Fla.
232, 118 So. 20 (1928).
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from the owner to the trespasser sufficiently fulfills the requirement
of asportation.8 Mere power to take and carry away, however, is not
usually sufficient. 6
Both the English and American courts have held that ...
the
mere shooting down of a live animal with felonious intent is not an
asportation of it sufficient in larceny; if there was no previous asportation, there must be also, it seems, some slight removal after the
killing."7 But if all the other elements of larceny be present, the
slightest removal after the killing is sufficient; and this is true even if
the removal is only by a "hair's breadth."8
The cases in point have been categorized according to various
factual situations to facilitate a more lucid discussion of the application of the doctrine of asportation to the killing of animals.
ENTCING OR CAmtYING AWAY BEFORE OR AFER KILLING

If an animal is led away before being killed, the decisions rather
consistently agree that the prior leading away constitutes asportation,
even though there is no subsequent removal of the dead animal. For
example, asportation exists from the beginning of the chase when the
been applied, however, when the accused enticed away a hog by
accused catches and ties up another's hogs. 9 The contrary view has
been applied, however, when the accused enticed away a hog by
dropping corn on the ground and then struck it with an axe, only to
flee immediately after the hog squealed. The court reasoned that in
the absence of caption there can be no asportation and, therefore,
5Johnson v. State, 9 Ga. App. 409, 71 S.E. 507 (1911); see Scott v. State, 138
Fla. 568, 189 So. 661 (1939) (if asportation is committed by another in presence
of accused with his connivance, he is as guilty as if he had done it himself); cf.
Long v. State, 44 Fla. 134, 32 So. 870 (1902).
6
Blakeney v. State, 31 Ala. App. 154, 13 So.2d 480 (1942); Thompson v.
State, 94 Ala. 535, 10 So. 520 (1892).
72 Bisnop, Ctn-nNxA. LAW §797 (8th ed. 1892) and cases therein cited; see
also Mi.xRa, CnnwUm . LAW §113 (1934); 2 WHAwToN, CRnMuNAL LAW §1165
(12th ed. 1932) and cases therein cited.
8
State v. Nelson, 121 W. Va. 310, 3 S.E.2d 530 (1939); for a good discussion of asportation see State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779 (1883).
9
Reynolds v. State, 199 Ark. 961, 136 S.W.2d 1028 (1940); see Delk v. State,
64 Miss. 77, 1 So. 9 (1886) (sufficient asportation when a jackass was moved 10
to 15 feet from the stable of its owner, killed and left there); cf. State v. Gilbert,
68 Vt. 188, 34 Atl. 697 (1896); State v. Carr, 13 Vt. 188 (1841) (accused who
caught two sheep, led them away from the pasture into a nearby thicket, and
killed and skinned one of them, held guilty of larceny).
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only an attempt can properly be charged.' 0
In the converse situation, when the accused first kills an animal,
drags it away to be butchered, and then flees before completing the
job, the decisions uniformly hold that he has the property under his
complete control and accordingly asports it."'
BUTCGERING

PLUS IEMOVAL OF PARTS

A second situation arises when the animal is killed and butchered
where it falls, the whole or parts of it then being removed. Most
jurisdictions, including Florida, 12 agree that any such removal constitutes larceny. 13 This broad rule apparently is qualified in some
jurisdictions, however, by the additional requirement that the part
carried off be of some value. Wounding a cow and removing its ears
has been held insufficient to sustain an indictment for common law
larceny.14 The court pointed out that, since the ears were of no
value, their removal was not sufficient to constitute asportation of the
cow. It is submitied, however, that the primary reason for this decision lies in the fact that the crime of malicious mischief rather than
larceny is indicated by such an act. An early English case draws a
distinction based on whether the cutting off occasions the death of the
animal, irrespective of the value of the part removed.' 5 This fact
likewise fails to prove an intent to steal, since it could readily indicate
10

Edmonds v. State, 70 Ala. 8 (1881); see Wolf v. State, 41 Ala. 412 (1868)
(no sufficient taking or carrying away by accused seen chasing a squealing hog
and in the act of stiking it).
"Williams v. State, 60 Ga. 367, 27 Am. Rep. 412 (1878); McIntosh v. State,
105 Neb. 828, 180 N.W. 573 (1920).
"2Flowers v. State, 69 FLa. 620, 68 So. 754 (1915) (killing cow, stripping hide
and leaving carcass behind constitute larceny and asportation).
13Davis v. State, 41 Ariz. 12, 15 P.2d 242 (1932) (killing a cow, and skinning
and cutting off two hind-quarters, held asportation and larceny of the whole
animal); Wilburn v. Territory, 10 N.M. 402, 62 Pac. 968 (1900); State v. Crossman, 189 Wash. 124, 63 P.2d 934 (1937); State v. Nelson, 121 W. Va. 810, 3
S.E.2d 530 (1939); Rex v. Williams, I Moody 107, 168 Eng. Rep. 1203 (Cr. Cs.
1825); Rex v. Rawlins, 2 East P.C. 617 (1800) (prisoner convicted for killing and
skinning lambs, when he took the hides only); see McPhail v. State, 9 Tex. App.
164 (1880) (per statute); Musque v. State, 41 Tex. 226 (1874) (per statute).
14
State v. Butler, 65 N.C. 809 (1871).
15
Rex v. Clay, RI. & R. 887, 168 Eng. Rep. 859 (Cr. Cs. 1819) (cutting off part
of a live sheep supports indictment for killing with intent to steal if the cutting off
necessarily causes death).
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malicious mischief. Probably the most that can be said of the removal
of only a part of the animal after killing is that a conviction of larceny
depends upon whether the particular jury infers an intent to steal.
The value of the part and the deadly effect of the cutting are both
considered in determining the presence of this intent.
BUTCOIG wrTHoUT REMOVAL OF PARTS

Another interpretation of asportation arises when no parts of the
butchered animal are removed. The Florida Supreme Court has
upheld a conviction of larceny based on butchering a cow where
shot and almost completing preparation of the beef for market before
discovery.' 6 Driggers v. State," which was cited as controlling,
presents an even more extreme finding of asportation. The accused
shot a heifer, and another person struck it in the throat to bleed it.
When shot it "fell in its tracks" on its side; there was no removal.
Nevertheless the Court unanimously held that the shooting and18
stabbing, together with taking possession, constituted larceny:
"The asportation of the thing stolen merely shows the complete
termination of the owner's possession and the actual possession of
the property by the wrongdoer. The severance of possession is
necessary to be shown therefore; but it is held that by the slightest
removal of the thing from the place where the owner placed it, or
wanted it to be, and though the transfer of possession existed for
a very brief period of time the offense is complete."
Consequently, moving the living animal from a standing to a prone
position and letting blood is sufficient to establish asportation in
Florida. Other jurisdictions have upheld convictions in similar instances, 19 although there is conflicting authority. For example, shoot16 Davis v. State, 97 Fla. 987, 122 So. 579 (1929).
"796 Fla. 282, 118 So. 20 (1928), 27 MIcH. L. REv. 102, 13 MmN,. L. REv. 383

(1929), 2 So. CAI.n L. REv. 84, 3 U. oF Cn. L. REv. 200 (1929).
18 Driggers v. State, 96 Fla. 232, 235, 118 So. 20, 21 (1928).
19 Seizing a hog and cutting its throat is asportation: Kemp v. State, 89 Ala. 52,

7 So. 413 (1889); Croom v. State, 71 Ala. 14 (1881). See Lundy v. State, 60 Ga.
148, 145 (1878), in which accused shot a cow and partially skinned it, and the
court found asportation in depriving her ". . . not only of her freedom of loco-

motion, but of her position, where her owner willed that she should remain at her
will ....
"
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ing a hog, turning it on its back, and cutting its throat without
carrying it away is not asportation in some jurisdictions. 20 Texas,
on the other hand, experiences no difficulty in upholding convictions
of this nature, inasmuch as its larceny statute dispenses with proof of
asportation.2 1
MERE KLuG

The extent to which courts are willing to go in order to find the
element of asportation is not settled. Perhaps the narrowest basis
is mere killing without further exercise of dominion. On this point
there is no uniformity of opinion. Shooting a hog and fleeing when
discovered near it have been held insufficient, standing alone, to
establish larceny, for the reason that some removal of the goods plus
complete possession by the accused for a moment, at least, is essential.22 Therefore, merely shooting a hog without taking possession
of it or carrying it away is trespass rather than larceny, and this is
true even when done with a felonious intent.23 Several states, however, have adopted a different view. For example, killing a hog by
knocking it in the head has been held equivalent to taking and carrying away with an intent to steal. 24 Again Texas deals readily with
such factual situations by means of its statute excluding asportation
as a requisite of theft; shooting an animal with intent to deprive the
20Williams v. State, 63 Miss. 58 (1885); State v. Alexander, 74 N.C. 232
(1876) (shooting a hog, cutting off its ears, and skinning one ham without
severing skin from body, held no more than having power of removal and therefore not asportation); cf. State v. Butler, 65 N.C. 309 (1871).
21
T= STAT., PEZr. CoDE arts. 1410, 1412 (Vernon 1948): McPhail v. State,
9 Tex. App. 164 (1880); Walker v. State, 3 Tex. App. 70 (1877); Musque v.
State, 41 Tex. 226 (1874).
22
State v. Seagler, 1 Rich. 30, 42 Am. Dec. 404 (S.C. 1844); see Edmonds v.
State,
70 Ala. 8 (1881); Wolf v. State, 41 Ala. 412 (1868).
23
Molton v. State, 105 Ala. 18, 16 So. 795 (1895) (accused seen with gun near
thicket where hog was recently killed, but not observed doing anything; merely
being near enough to exercise dominion and control after killing held insufficient,
since possession of owner must be severed by actual taking of possession by
accused).
24
Cross v. State, 64 Ga. 443 (1879); see Frazier v. State, 85 Ala. 17, 4 So. 691
(1887) (shooting and killing hog and covering it with branches with intent to
return later and carry it-away after obtaining consent of owner through misrepresentation, held larceny, because caption may be constructive when possession is
obtained by trick, fraud, or deception).
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owner of its value sustains a conviction of larceny,2 5 since mere killing
constitutes the taking and no manual possession is necessary.
KILLING AS ASPORTATION IN FLORIDA

A recent Florida case, Lyons v. State,26 highlights the complexity
of the asportation concept. A calf was shot near the highway in an
area in which the accused was seen. Several days later empty shells
of the caliber of those that killed the calf were found in his truck.
He maintained that a third party shot the calf and drove off when
he approached, and when he observed it, apparently wounded, he
merely stopped to investigate. The prosecution offered no testimony
in contradiction. The accused did not flee when discovered near the
animal, and his wife corroborated his story of the incident. On
appeal from the lower court's conviction of larceny, he contended that
the evidence was insufficient to establish a ". . .. 'taking and
carrying away or the asportation of the animal.'"27 The Supreme
Court reversed in a four to three decision, distinguishing Driggers v.
State,28 Davis v. State,29 and Fitch v. State.80 The rationale of the
Driggers case, relied upon by the prosecution, is that the slightest
removal of the thing stolen from its original position establishes
asportation. The Court found, however, that "The State failed to
show the appellant shot the calf or had it in his possession or fled
the scene when some of the State witnesses appeared. It is our conclusion that the State's evidence in the case at bar failed to meet
the rule enunciated in the Driggers case ....- 31
The Lyons opinion indicates that the inadequacy of the evidence
connecting the defendant with the shooting was the primary reason
for the reversal of conviction, but the citing of the Driggers case
raises several interesting questions. Although in the Lyons case the
calf was shot, no showing of physical caption or of asportation appears.
The Court, therefore, in pointing out that the prosecution failed to
meet the Driggers test, may be additionally implying that there was
25

Coombes v. State, 17 Tex. App. 258 (1884); Hall v. State, 41 TeM. 287

(1874).
2647 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1950).
271d. at 541.
2896 Fla. 232, 118 So. 20 (1928).
2997 Fla. 987, 122 So. 579 (1929).
80135 Fla. 361, 185 So. 435 (1938).
SlLyons v. State, 47 So.2d 541, 542 (Fla. 1950).
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a lack of evidence of asportation, proof of which is essential to conviction of larceny. To construe the Lyons decision in any other
fashion is to hold that all elements of larceny existed and that the
only failure was that of proof. This construction, however, would
logically force the Court to take the position that the falling of the
calf constituted asportation. Such a conclusion involves extending
the doctrine of asportation beyond even the Driggers decision, in
view of the fact that the Court expressly states that the defendant
did not take possession of the calf. The Driggers doctrine requires
at least a caption of the animal, either as an essential characteristic
of asportation or as a separate and. distinct factor in establishing
larceny, as well as a felonious intent of the accused to convert the
property to his own use.
The Lyons dissent plays an important role in predicting the course
that the Court will probably follow. The absence of a dissenting
opinion makes it impossible to ascertain the precise views of the three
justices favoring affirmance of the conviction. Obviously they did
not regard the allged facts as proved but nevertheless insufficient to
establish larceny, inasmuch as such a view would call for a concurring opinion rather than a dissent. They must have been satisfied
not only with the evidence but also with the allegations, whereas the
other four justices were dissatisfied with at least the sufficiency of
the evidence and possibly with the allegations as well. The dissenters
were willing to base larceny on the fatal shooting alone. In other
words, assuming that asportation is still a necessary element of larceny,
mere falling to the ground constitutes asportation. Furthermore,
according to the dissent, the removal of some part of the animal is
not essential to establish possession. Under this view, firing a bullet
that kills an animal amounts constructively to caption,3 2 which in
turn establishes asportation. Perhaps the dissenting justices would
do away with the distinction between caption and asportation altogether and hold that caption is not a separate element of larceny but
only a factor tending to show asportation. The definition and need
for the element of caption in larceny accordingly becomes as elusive
as that of asportation.
To hold that larceny can rest on mere killing unaccompanied by
either physical possession or some moving of the animal gives a unique
32Cf. Frazier v. State, 85 Ala. 17, 4 So. 691 (1887); Scott v. State, 138 Fla.
568, 189 So. 661 (1939); see notes 10, 25 supra; 2
§1164 (12 ed. 1932).
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turn to this crime, despite at least one precedent.3 3 When, for instance, a cow is shot while lying down, does the dropping of its head
or any other movement caused by the impact of the bullet establish
asportation? Similarly, when viewed in relation to larceny of nonliving chattels, does shooting a hole through an automobile tire when
accompanied by an intent to steal the car, or entering the car and
34
releasing the brake with the intent to steal, amount to asportation?
An extension of the doctrine this far would virtually eliminate the
distinction between attempted larceny and larceny.
This leads to the final question of whether asportation as construed
in larceny of animals has been placed by the bench in a category
altogether separate from that applicable to larceny of other types of
property. Perhaps asportation of animals merits special interpretation for at least two reasons: (1) A dead animal is usually of no more
value to the owner than one that is captured alive and carried away;
and (2) the importance of cattle, hogs and similar animals to the
economy of Florida urges the vigorous protection of owners against
their loss.
LEcmSLATOrX

AGAINST Kir.NG ANndAis

Our legislation against killing or stealing domestic animals springs
from England, where either was once punishable by death.3 5 Not
until 1827 was this penalty reduced to imprisonment, 0 and positive
action as to the term of servitude was not taken until 1861.3 7 Recognizing the necessity for the protection of domestic animals, Parliament
has consistently made either stealing or killing them a felony. although
distinguishing between stealing, malicious killing, and killing with
intent to steal.38
A survey of American statutes evidences departure from the English
position. Almost every state has some provision against stealing,
malicious shooting, or killing; stealing is generally a felony, while the
latter two crimes are misdemeanors. Florida has such statutes, al33

Cross v. State, 64 Ga. 443 (1879).

34

State v. Jones, 65 N.C. 395 (1871) (turning barrel of turpentine on its side
with intent to take held no asportation for purposes of larceny); cf. Driggers v.
State, 96 Fla. 282, 118 So. 20 (1928).
859 GEo. I, c. 22 (1722); 14 CEO. I, c. 6, §1 (1741); 16 GEo. II, c. 34 (1742).
887 & 8 GEO. IV, c. 30 (1827).

8724 & 25 Vier. c. 96, §96 (1861); 24 &25 Vscr. c. 97, §40 (1861).
88Ibid.
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though malicious killing is a felony rather than a misdemeanor.39
Approximately one sixth of the states recognize the English distinction
and punish as a separate offense killing with intent to steal, although
this act also constitutes the crime of larceny, or some other felony, or
both. The presence of these statutes renders difficult any ascertainment of whether the legislatures, in enacting them, contemplated
larceny.4 0 Some statutes expressly so state,41 thereby eliminating the
common law elements of larceny other than the intent to steal. Texas
has not included asportation in its statutory definition of theft,4 2 nor
has Louisiana, 43 although tha Louisiana courts have not yet held that
this failure to mention asportation renders proof of it unnecessary.
North Carolina has expressly ruled out possession and, by implication,
asportation as elements of larceny of cattle; but intent of the accused
89FLA. STAT. §811.11 (1949), "Whoever commits larceny by stealing any...
cow,... the property of another, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison not less than two years nor more than five years" (contemplates asportation); §828.07, "Whoever willfully and maliciously kills .. .any .. .cattle . ..
of another person... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not
exceeding five years, or in the county jail not exceeding twelve months, or by fine
not exceeding one thousand dollars"; §828.09, "Whoever willfully or wantonly and
without malice towards the owners kills, maims or disfigures any horse, cattle or
other animals belonging to another person, shall be punished by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars."
40
E.g., CONN. ThEv. GEN. STAT. §8400 (1949): "Any person who shall ...
unlawfully enter the premises of another and kill any such animal either for the
purpose of taking the flesh thereof or to maliciously injure the owner, shall be
imprisoned not more than five years"; AuK. STAT. AN. tit. 41, §3917 (1947).
41K.( GEN. STAT. AN. §21-589 (1935): "if any person ... . shall willfully
kill such animal [including cattle] with intent to steal or convert to his own use
the carcass or skin or any part of the animal so killed, he shall be adjudged guilty
of larceny and punished in the same manner as if he had feloniously stolen such
animal"; Mo. BEv. STAT. ANN. §4462 (1939); see Nv. Co?". LAws ANN.
110325 (Supp. 1949).
42 Tnx. STAT., PmNAL CODE art. 1410 (Vernon 1948): "'Theft' is the fraudulent
taldng of corporeal personal property belonging to another from his possession
.. without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the same,
and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking."
43
LA. CODE CimI. LAW & PNoc, ANN. art. 740-67 (1943): "Theft is the
misappropriation or taldng of anything of value which belongs to another, either
without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is
essendal."
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to convert to his own use must, of course, still be proved. 4 4
CONCLUSION

Actual removal of the animal or of any vital or valuable part,
whether before or after killing, generally constitutes asportation.
When, however, the animal is neither enticed or taken away beforehand nor removed afterward, there is obviously no asportation. When
it is not touched, there is not even caption, let alone asportation,
accurately speaking. Our Supreme Court, while paying lip service
to the common law requirement of asportation, has for all practical
purposes eliminated it as an element of larceny. Despite the fact
that asportition literally means carrying away, we find that asportation is essential but carrying away is not. That the result of this
conceptual impasse may be expedient is not denied. Some states
have openly and properly repealed the common law by statute.
Florida has reached the same goal by judicial repeal, although this
process inherently involves professing adherence to established principles while reaching a decision diametrically opposed to them.
Carrying away is unnecessary to conviction of larceny of animals in
Florida today. 4 5 By one vote in the Lyons case 46 physical caption is
still a requisite; but the majority emphasis on insufficiency of evidence of shooting or fleeing throws doubt on even this proposition.
Our law governing stealing, killing and wounding of various types
of animals is one of the most confused and disorganized portions of
the Florida statutes today. 47 When a long overdue revision is attempted, the Legislature must decide whether in modem society
there is any practical reason for distinguishing between stealing on
the one hand and killing with malice toward the owner on the other. 48
44

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-85 (1943): "If any person shall pursue, kill or
wound any . . . cattle, . ..
the property of another, with the intent unlawfully
and feloniously to convert the same to his own use, he shall be guilty of a felony,

and shall be punishable, in all respects, as if convicted of larceny, though such
animal may not have come into the actual possession of the person so offending."
45
Driggers v. State, 96 Fla. 232, 118 So. 20 (1928).

46Lyons v. State, 47 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1950).
47
Notably FLA. STAT. cc. 811, 828 (1949).
48At the same time, the Legislature may well consider whether killing or
wounding of a trespassing animal menacing lives or destroying crops is any crime
at all. A social objective far more important to Floridians than raising cattle or

hogs was achieved in the recent fencing statute, FLA.
analyzed in Legis., 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 223 (1950).
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